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LEGAL SHORTS:
RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I. RoHLFs V. KLEMENHAGEN, LLO
In Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed
Montana's stricter notice requirement for plaintiffs who bring claims under
the Dram Shop Act compared with plaintiffs who bring negligence claims
in general. Upholding Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6), the Court
dismissed a suit brought by an injured couple against a tavern because they
filed the suit a little over a year after the accident, in violation of the stat-
ute's 180-day notice provision. The Court concluded that the Dram Shop
Act is not invalid as special legislation and does not deny plaintiffs equal
protection of the law. 2
One June evening in 2006, Joseph Warren left the Stumble Inn tavern
in his pickup truck after many hours of drinking.3 He later crashed into an
automobile driven by Cary Rohlfs, causing Rohlfs severe injuries.4 The
Montana Highway Patrol officers at the scene of the accident noticed that
Warren smelled of alcohol; a test later revealed his blood alcohol level was
0.14.5 Warren pleaded guilty to negligent vehicular assault.6 Both the
Rohlfs and Stumble Inn employees knew soon after the accident that War-
ren had been drinking alcohol at the tavern just before the collision oc-
curred. 7
In July 2007, a little over a year after the accident, Cary and Terra
Rohlfs filed a complaint alleging Stumble Inn was liable for the injuries
they suffered in the crash. 8 The Rohlfs claimed Stumble Inn employees had
served Warren alcohol while he was visibly intoxicated, in violation of
Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(3)(b). 9 Stumble Inn moved to dis-
miss the complaint, arguing the Rohlfs failed to comply with the 180-day
notice provision in Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6).10 The Rohlfs
conceded that they did not give notice within the 180 days required by the
statute, but argued the notice provision was unconstitutional and violated
1. Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 227 P.3d 42 (Mont. 2009).
2. Id. at 50.
3. Id. at 45.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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their right to equal protection of the law.'I The district court rejected the
Rohlfs' arguments and granted Stumble Inn's motion to dismiss. 12
On appeal, the Rohlfs first argued Montana Code Annotated
§ 27-1-710(6) is special legislation prohibited by Article V, § 12, of the
Montana Constitution. 13 The Rohlfs asserted that cases against bar owners
under the Dram Shop Act are indistinguishable from negligence cases gen-
erally, and the 180-day notice provision thus singles out Dram Shop plain-
tiffs for "a unique procedural disability that is arbitrary and does not arise
from any distinction that can withstand constitutional muster." 14
The Montana Constitution provides that the Legislature shall not pass
a special act when a general act is, or can be made, applicable. 15 Citing
prior cases, the Montana Supreme Court reiterated that a law is unconstitu-
tional "if it confers particular privileges or disabilities upon a class of per-
sons arbitrarily selected from a larger group of persons, all of whom stand
in the same relation to the privileges or disabilities." 16 However a law is
constitutional if the classification of persons is reasonable and the law oper-
ates equally upon every person in the given class.17 The Court further
noted that it presumes a law is constitutional and a classification reasona-
ble.' 8
Examining the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act, the Court
stated that Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6) does set up a class:
"those who seek to recover from a person or entity who furnished alcohol to
a visibly intoxicated person who later caused an injury."' 19 The Legislature
adopted the 180-day notice provision to help minimize the difficulty of
gathering evidence and locating witnesses concerning events where poten-
tial defendants were not present and perhaps not aware of their possible
liability. 20 Although the dissent strongly disagreed with the Legislature's
policy decisions underlying Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6), the
Court recognized that it "has no license to psychoanalyze the legislators." 2'
Because a classification is presumed reasonable and since the law at issue
operated uniformly and equally upon every person seeking redress under
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 45.
14. Id. at 45-46.
15. Mont. Const. art. 5, § 12.
16. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 46.
17. Id. (citing State ex rel. Fisher v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 34 P.2d 522, 525-526 (Mont. 1934)).
18. Id. (citing Great Falls Nat. Bank v. McCormick, 448 P.2d 991, 993 (Mont. 1968)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 46-47.
21. Id. at 47.
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the Dram Shop Act, the Court found the Act is not unconstitutional as spe-
cial legislation. 22
The Rohlfs next argued Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6) vio-
lated the Montana Constitution's equal protection provision 23 by imposing a
burden on plaintiffs who bring a case under the Dram Shop Act that is not
imposed on other negligence plaintiffs. 24 In analyzing an equal protection
challenge, the Court first identifies the classes involved and determines
whether they are similarly situated with respect to a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose of the law. 25 If the classes are not similarly situated, there is no
equal protection violation. 26 If they are similarly situated, the law may still
be constitutional so long as it operates equally upon those within the clas-
ses.2 7 The Rohlfs asserted that dram-shop plaintiffs and general negligence
plaintiffs are similarly situated classes, while Stumble Inn argued that they
are "sufficiently different. '28 The Court agreed with the Rohlfs, acknowl-
edging that although plaintiffs who bring a claim under the Dram Shop Act
must take an additional step to comply with the notice requirement, "they
are still in a similar situation as others who allege injury by the wrongful act
or omission of another. '29
The Court concluded that rational basis was the appropriate test for
analyzing whether a liability limitation imposed through a special statute of
limitations violates equal protection. 30 The Court maintained that "the
[L]egislature may impose reasonable procedural requirements on available
remedies so long as those requirements have a rational basis. '31
The Rohlfs contended that the Legislature had no rational basis for
requiring Dram Shop Act plaintiffs to provide taverns notice within 180
days of the alcohol sale at issue.32 They claimed the proposition that tavern
owners have greater difficulty preserving evidence and locating witnesses
than other negligence defendants is fundamentally flawed because the Leg-
islature was presented with insufficient evidence on the matter.33 Although
the Rohlfs referred the Court to the proceedings before the Fifty-eighth
Legislature where the notice requirement was discussed, the Court firmly
22. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 47.
23. Mont. Const. art. 1I, § 4.
24. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 47-48.
25. Id. at 48 (citing Farrier v. Teacher's Ret. Bd., 120 P.3d 390 (Mont. 2005); Oberson v. U.S.
Dept. of Agric., Forest Serv., 171 P.3d 715 (Mont. 2007)).
26. Id. (citing State v. Egdorf 77 P.3d 517 (Mont. 2003)).
27. Id. (citing Farrier, 120 P.3d at 395).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 49 (citing Reeves v. lle Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 647, 652 (Mont. 1976)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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stated: "It is not for this Court to review the quantity and quality of infor-
mation that moved the Legislature to act. The Court's task is to examine
the result and if the law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose, it withstands a constitutional challenge. 34
The Court concluded that there is a clear rationale for the 180-day
notice requirement.35 The Court explained that in an action under the Dram
Shop Act, a plaintiff has immediate knowledge of the incident and therefore
the opportunity to investigate and preserve evidence right away. 36 The de-
fendant, on the other hand, was likely not at the scene of the incident and
may not even be aware of its occurrence. 37 The notice requirement was
passed so that a defendant, just like a plaintiff, can locate witnesses and
preserve potential evidence.3 8 The Court noted that two other special stat-
utes of limitation have survived equal protection challenges in Montana as
well. 39 Concluding that Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6) is ration-
ally related to a legitimate government purpose, the Court held it does not
violate Article II, § 4, of the Montana Constitution.40
Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's judgment, finding
that Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6) is not invalid as special legis-
lation and does not deny plaintiffs equal protection of the law. 41
Three judges dissented, with Justice Nelson discussing at length the
history behind the Dram Shop Act and the legislative proceedings on Senate
Bill 337, codified at Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-710(6).42 He argued
the notice provision is unconstitutional special legislation, disagreeing with
the policy behind it and claiming the evidence presented to the legislature to
justify its passing was insufficient.43 Further, he pointed out that since
Stumble Inn was aware of the incident soon after it occurred, the purpose of
the notice provision-to be sure the tavern had fair opportunity to preserve
evidence and locate witnesses-would not have been served had the Rohlfs
provided notice within 180 days.44
Montana practitioners should be aware of Rohlfs and recognize the
Court's strict adherence to the 180-day notice provision of the Dram Shop
34. Id.
35. Id. at 49-50.
36. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 50.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id
42. Rohlfs, 227 P.3d at 57-64 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 52; id. at 47 (majority).
44. Id. at 52 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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Act. In representing plaintiffs under the Act, practitioners must adhere to
this special statute of limitations to prevent dismissal of their case.
-Haley Connell
U. STATE V. ZIMMERMAN 45
In State v. Zimmerman, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a district
court order requiring Donald E. Zimmerman to remove his indoor pets from
Teton County as a condition of a deferred sentence for maintaining a public
nuisance.46 The district court found a nexus existed, sufficient to establish
a connection under Montana Code Annotated § 46-18-201(4)(o), between
Zimmerman's conviction-stemming from feeding feral cats in Teton
County-and the sentencing condition. 47
Zimmerman, a 67-year-old Korean War veteran living in Great Falls,
Montana, cared for his six indoor pets in a dilapidated house in Dutton,
Montana.48 Zimmerman traveled to Dutton daily to feed his five cats and
15-year-old poodle.49 Following this routine, Zimmerman left food outside
for feral cats.50
In May 2008, the State charged Zimmerman with maintaining a public
nuisance, a misdemeanor.51 The State's complaint alleged that, by feeding
a number of feral cats in various locations around Dutton, Zimmerman had
purposely or knowingly maintained a condition that was offensive to the
senses and obstructed the free use of property of a considerable number of
people. 52 The residents of Dutton complained of the urine smell and excre-
ment left by the cats, caterwauling, and damaged flowerbeds and shrubbery,
as well as unwanted kittens and dead cats found around town. 53
After a justice court found Zimmerman guilty of maintaining a public
nuisance, he appealed to the district court.54 Before a six-person jury, evi-
dence revealed that when Zimmerman would come to Dutton to feed his
indoor pets, he would leave milk jugs full of food around town, which at-
tracted and was consumed by the feral cats. 55 Despite a few residents' ef-
forts to trap and relocate 30 to 40 cats and alter and re-home nine, the
45. State v. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d 1109 (Mont. 2010).
46. Id. at 1111, 1113.
47. Id. at 1111.
48. Id. at 1110.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1110.
52. Id.
53. 1d
54. Id.
55. 1d.
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population of feral cats did not decrease.5 6 Additionally, various town and
county officials confronted Zimmerman about the problem, but the situation
remained the same.57 Zimmerman testified that he left food out for the cats
because he loved animals and did not want them to starve; however, he
denied ever bringing feral cats to the area.5 8
The jury returned a guilty verdict. 59 At the sentencing hearing, the
State requested that the district court fine Zimmerman $500 and suggested a
two-year deferred imposition of sentence subject to various conditions, one
being that Zimmerman remove his indoor pets from Teton County. 60 The
State maintained that neighbors complained about the indoor pets as well,
and because the State had evidence that Zimmerman was still feeding the
feral cats after the verdict, it argued that a nexus existed between this condi-
tion and Zimmerman's conviction for maintaining a public nuisance.61 The
district court agreed that a nexus existed that was sufficient to establish a
connection under Montana Code Annotated § 46-18-201(4)(o).62 Thus,
the district court sentenced Zimmerman to a fine and a deferred sentence of
two years. 63 Additionally, the court imposed a condition prohibiting Zim-
merman from feeding animals or possessing animal food in Teton County
and required him to remove his indoor pets from the County.64 Zimmerman
moved to stay execution of the sentence pending appeal, arguing it would
cause him irreparable harm to remove his pets from Dutton. 65 The district
court denied the motion.66
Zimmerman appealed to the Montana Supreme Court on the issue of
whether the district court erred when it required Zimmerman to remove his
indoor pets from Teton County as a condition of his deferred sentence. 67
Zimmerman argued the sentencing condition was illegal because there was
no nexus connecting it to his conviction and therefore the condition was
merely a punishment for the harm he caused the community.68 The Court
affirmed the order holding that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion.69
56. Id.
57. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1110.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1110-1111.
61. Id. at 1111.
62. Id.
63. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1111.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1111-1112.
69. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1112.
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The Court began its analysis by discussing the broad discretion a dis-
trict court has when deferring an imposition of a sentence. 70 A district
court has the authority to impose "any... reasonable restrictions or condi-
tions considered necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the vic-
tim or society. '71 When it comes to sentencing, a district court has the
authority to impose "any... limitation reasonably related to the objectives
of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society." 72 The Court
noted that the broad discretion is not without limit; the conditions must
relate to rehabilitation or protection of society within the particular context
of an offender's crime, background, characteristics, or modes of conduct.73
The Court has described this requirement using the terms "offense nexus"
and "offender nexus."' 74 While the nexus need not be direct, the Court will
reverse a district court if it is absent.75
The Court concluded that, given the broad discretion granted by Mon-
tana Code Annotated §§ 46-18-201(4)(o) and 46-18-202(1)(f), the district
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Zimmerman to remove his
pets from Teton County. 76 The Court reasoned that while the indoor pets
were not the basis of the nuisance charge, they were a central aspect of
Zimmerman's daily feeding routine that led to him feeding the feral cats.77
Evidence at trial indicated that Zimmerman had a routine for several years
of feeding his indoor pets, dumping food on his doorstep, and then leaving
food in various other locations.78 By removing the indoor pets, the district
court eliminated the central reason for Zimmerman's feeding routine, and
thus reduced the likelihood that Zimmerman would return to feeding the
feral cats.79 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the condition was reasonably
related to protecting the community from further nuisances. 80
Zimmerman raised several arguments against this conclusion. First,
Zimmerman asserted that he had protected property rights in his pets.8'
While the Court acknowledged that Zimmerman did have property rights in
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201(4)(o) (2009)).
72. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-202(l)(0).
73. Id. (citing State v. Herd, 87 P.3d 1017, 1020-1021 (Mont. 2004); State v. Ashby, 179 P.3d
1164, 1167-1168 (Mont. 2008); State v. Greensweight, 187 P.3d 613, 618 (Mont. 2008); State v. Om-
mundson, 974 P.2d 620, 623 (Mont. 1999), rev'd in part on other grounds, State v. Herman, 188 P.3d
978, 981 (Mont. 2008)).
74. Id. at 1112 (citations omitted).
75. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1112 (citing State v. Hunter, 197 P.3d 998, 1000 (Mont. 2008); State
v. Jones, 199 P.3d 216, 220-221 (Mont. 2008)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1112.
2011
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his pets, it concluded the district court did not deprive him of these rights. 82
Instead, it merely required him to keep his property somewhere other than
Teton County-where Zimmerman neither resided nor owned property.83
Zimmerman's next argument was also quickly dismissed; he asserted that
there was no basis for believing continued care of his indoor pets would
harm them.84 The Court countered that it was not concerned with harm to
the indoor pets, but rather with the potential that Zimmerman would con-
tinue feeding the feral cats. 85 Finally, Zimmerman asserted that the condi-
tion was unduly harsh; requiring him to remove his indoor pets did nothing
but punish both him and his animals. 86 He argued that because he could not
keep his animals in Great Falls, he would be forced to give up his long-time
companion animals. 87 The Court noted that there was no support in the
record for that argument; Zimmerman presented no testimony that he was
unable to keep his pets in Great Falls. 88 For these reasons, the Court af-
firmed the sentencing condition and concluded that the district court's im-
position of the condition was not so punitive that it amounted to an abuse of
discretion. 89
Specially concurring, Chief Justice Mike McGrath quoted Montana
Code Annotated § 46-18-201(4)(o) and concluded that the sentence im-
posed here was "clearly authorized to protect the community from the pub-
lic nuisance that resulted from Zimmerman's inability to care for his
pets." 90
Also concurring, Justice James C. Nelson concluded that the condition
was proper under the Court's analysis as well as under an additional multi-
factor standard of review for sentences. 9t Regarding sentences involving at
least one year of actual incarceration, Nelson summarized a court's review
of conditions as follows:
Unobjected-to conditions are not reviewed at all. Objected-to conditions that
are expressly authorized by statute are reviewed under the arbitrariness stan-
dard (i.e., whether the sentencing court acted arbitrarily without conscientious
judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason) .... But objected-to conditions
imposed under § 46-18-201(4)(o) or § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA (authorizing
"any other" reasonable restrictions) are reviewed under the nexus test.92
82. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 70-1-104(2)).
83. Id. at 1113.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1113.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1113 (McGrath, M., concurring).
91. Id. at 1113 (Nelson, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1114-1115 (citations omitted).
Vol. 72
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Nelson then summarized a court's review of conditions for sentences in-
volving less than one year of actual incarceration:
For sentences that ... involve less than one year of actual incarceration, this
Court formerly reviewed such sentences for both legality and equity. Now,
however, a third standard has been injected into the mix: clear inadequacy or
excessiveness. Thus, henceforth, this Court must review sentences ... for (1)
legality, (2), equitability, and (3) clear inadequacy or excessiveness ...93
Nelson concluded that Zimmerman objected to the sentencing condi-
tion, the condition was legal and equitable, it had a nexus to the offense,
and it was not clearly inadequate or excessive. 94 Nelson maintained the
condition satisfied every standard of review and thus was appropriate. 95
The Montana practitioner should be aware of the broad discretion a
district court has in imposing sentencing conditions. A sentencing condi-
tion need not satisfy both the "offense nexus" and the "offender nexus."
Thus, the Court may ignore whether a sentencing condition is related to the
offender's unique background, characteristics, or conduct, as it did in Zim-
merman, and uphold it so long as it is reasonably related to the protection of
society within the particular context of an offender's crime. Additionally,
the Montana practitioner should recognize the importance of the Court's
emphasis that the required nexus can be indirect.
-Francesca diStefano
III. STANDARD INSURANCE Co. v. MORPJSON
9 6
In Standard Insurance Co. v. Morrison, the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the "savings clause" within the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") applied to Montana State
Auditor and insurance commissioner John Morrison's ("Commissioner")
practice of disapproving insurance contracts containing discretionary
clauses. 97 The court also held that the Commissioner's practice did not
conflict with ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme for insureds who are de-
nied benefits. 98 As a result of the decision, all claims resulting from a de-
nial of benefits under an ERISA plan in Montana are now subject to a less
deferential de novo standard of review.
Montana law requires the Commissioner to "disapprove any [insur-
ance] form ... if the form ... contains ... any inconsistent, ambiguous, or
93. Zimmerman, 228 P.3d at 1115 (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Standard Ins. Co. v.
Lindeen, 130 S.Ct. 3275 (2010).
97. id. at 845.
98. Id. at 849.
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misleading clauses or exceptions and conditions which deceptively affect
the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract." 99
The Commissioner interpreted this statute as a mandate to disapprove any
insurance contract containing a discretionary clause.1°° When Standard In-
surance Co. ("Standard") submitted proposed disability insurance forms
containing discretionary clauses, the Commissioner, according to his prac-
tice, denied the forms.10' Standard sued in the U.S. District Court of Mon-
tana, alleging the practice was preempted under ERISA. Judge Donald
Molloy granted the Commissioner summary judgment, and Standard ap-
pealed. 102
Discretionary clauses grant the insurer full discretion to determine ben-
efits and amounts payable under an insurance contract, as well as the ability
to interpret all provisions of the plan.103 When insurance contracts contain
discretionary clauses, courts review the insurance companies' decisions
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, whereas in the absence of
such a clause, the default standard is de novo.'0 4 Here, the court noted that
discretionary clauses are controversial, noting that the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners believes "a ban on such clauses would miti-
gate the conflict of interest present when the claims adjudicator also pays
the benefit."' 105 Conversely, the court acknowledged the argument that dis-
cretionary clauses keep insurance costs manageable because more cases
might be filed if courts always used a de novo standard of review.' 06 With-
out this tool to control litigation costs, employers might be discouraged
from offering employee benefits in the first place. 10 7
The starting point for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis was
that ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any [covered] employee benefit plan."'1 8 However, ER-
ISA's savings clause excludes from preemption "any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."' 09 The court referenced
the historical tension between these two clauses, quoting the United States
Supreme Court:
99. Id. at 840 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 33-1-502 (2009)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 841.
102. Standard Ins. Co, 584 F.3d at 841.
103. Id. at 840.
104. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114-115 (1989)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 841.
107. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (Roberts, CJ., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
109. Id. at § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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The unhelpful drafting of these antiphonal clauses occupies a substantial
share of this Court's time. In trying to extrapolate congressional intent in a
case like this, when congressional language seems simultaneously to preempt
everything and hardly anything, we have no choice but to temper the assump-
tion that the ordinary meaning... accurately expresses the legislative purpose
with the qualification that the historic police powers of the States were not
[meant] to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.'
10
Neither party contested that the disputed practice related to employee bene-
fit plans covered by ERISA."'I Therefore, the state law and practice would
be preempted by ERISA unless it fell within the savings clause.
The court explained that a state law must meet a two-part test set forth
in Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller in order to fall
within the savings clause exception.'" 2 The law "must be specifically di-
rected toward entities engaged in insurance."'"13 Also, it "must substantially
affect the risk-pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured."' 14
Standard argued the Commissioner's practice of denying insurance
forms with discretionary clauses failed the first prong of the test because it
was not specifically directed at insurers, but instead at ERISA plans and
procedures." 15 The court rejected this argument, stating it was "well-estab-
lished that a law which regulates what terms insurance companies can place
in their policies regulates insurance companies."' 1 6 The court adopted the
United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in American Council
of Life Insurers v. Ross' '7 that "[g]iven that the rules impose conditions
only on an insurer's right to engage in the business of insurance in [the
state,] . . . the rules are directed toward entities engaged in the business of
insurance."11 8
Standard further argued that the Commissioner's practice was not spe-
cifically directed at insurers because it merely applied "laws of general ap-
plication that have some bearing on insurers."' 19 More specifically, Stan-
dard alleged that the practice was an attempt to apply the common-law rule
requiring contracts to be interpreted against their drafter.' 20 The court
looked to the United States Supreme Court's analysis in UNUM Life Insur-
110. Standard Ins.Co, 584 F.3d at 841(quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
364-365 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
111. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
112. Ky. Assn. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 842.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Am. Council of Life Insurers v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009).
118. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 842 (quoting Am. Council of Life Insurers, 558 F.3d at 605).
119. Id. (quoting Ky. Assn. of Health Plans, Inc., 538 U.S. at 334).
120. Id.
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ance Co. of America v. Ward'21 and rejected this argument, holding that a
common-law maxim is directed at the insurance industry when it is consist-
ently applied to insurance contracts and is not just a general principle a
court may choose whether or not to apply.1 22
Standard next turned to the second prong of the Kentucky Association
of Health Plans, Inc. test which requires a state law to substantially affect
the risk-pooling arrangement in order to fall within the saving-clause excep-
tion. Standard argued that the practice of disapproving discretionary
clauses does not substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement. 123 Insur-
ance companies engage in risk pooling when they receive a large number of
relatively small premiums so they can afford to compensate the few in-
sureds who suffer losses.' 24 Without the risk-pooling requirement, "any
state law aimed at insurance companies could be deemed a law that regu-
lates insurance."' 25 The court gave the following example of this principle:
"a state law requiring insurers to pay their janitors twice the minimum wage
would not regulate insurance because it would have no effect on the risk-
pooling relationship between insurers and the insured."1 26
Here, on the other hand, the court held that the Commissioner's prac-
tice substantially affects the risk-pooling arrangement. The court found that
the Commissioner's practice narrows the scope of permissible bargains be-
tween insurers and insureds. 127 By removing the deferential abuse-of-dis-
cretion standard of review, the practice likely leads to more claims being
paid, thereby substantially affecting the risk-pooling arrangement. 128 The
court concluded that the Commissioner's practice meets both prongs of the
Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. test "more so than other laws
which have been upheld by the Supreme Court." Thus, the court held the
Commissioner's practice falls within the savings clause and is exempt from
ERISA preemption. 129
Standard also contended that the Commissioner's practice conflicted
with ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme. 130 The court noted that in Aetna
Health v. Davila,13 1 the United States Supreme Court held that "any state-
law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA
121. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999).
122. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 843-844 (quoting UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 526 U.S. at
369-371).
123. Id. at 844 (citing Ky. Assn. of Health Plans, Inc., 538 U.S. at 338).
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Ky. Assn. of Health Plans, Inc., 538 U.S. at 338).
126. Id. at 844.
127. Id. at 844-845.
128. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 845.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 846.
131. Aetna Health v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to
make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted."1 32 In
Aetna Health, the state statute at issue allowed for recovery of a greater
scope of damages than under ERISA, thus upsetting "the careful balancing"
Congress engaged in when crafting the "limited remedies under ERISA."' 33
In this case, however, the court found that the Commissioner's practice pro-
vided no additional remedy; insureds are still only able to recover the value
of their denied claim. ' 34 The court held that because de novo review is the
default standard under ERISA, a practice which merely reinforces the de-
fault cannot be construed as supplying a new remedy.' 35
The court acknowledged this approach could lead to "disuniformity"
between states in terms of rights and remedies under ERISA; however, the
court noted that the United States Supreme Court had found that "[sluch
disuniformities... are the inevitable result of the congressional decision to
save local insurance regulation."' 36 According to the court, the Commis-
sioner's practice worked solely to eliminate insurer advantage, an objective
"which the Supreme Court has identified as central to any reasonable under-
standing of the savings clause."' 37 Providing no new substantive right, re-
medial scheme or procedure foreign to ERISA, the Commissioner's prac-
tice thus does not conflict with ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme.138
In sum, the court held that the Commissioner's practice of disapprov-
ing discretionary clauses is "specifically directed toward entities engaged in
insurance ... [and] substantially affect[s] the risk-pooling arrangement be-
tween the insurer and the insured."' 39 Additionally, despite tension be-
tween the Commissioner's practice and federal common law concerning the
standard of review in ERISA disputes, the court did not see fit to create a
new exception to the savings clause.140 Therefore, it affirmed the district
court's decision that the practice is not preempted by ERISA's exclusive
remedial scheme. 141
For the Montana practitioner, the clear impact of this case is that all
benefits-denial cases will now receive the in-depth, de novo standard of
review. Whether this practice will lead to increased premiums, as argued
by Standard, remains to be seen. One likely result of this pro-consumer
132. Id. at 846 (quoting Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209).
133. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 215 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987)).
134. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 846.
135. Id. (citing Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 115).
136. Id. at 848 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381 (2002)).
137. Id. at 849.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Ky. Assn. of Health Plans, Inc., 538 U.S. at 342).
140. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 849.
141. Id.
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ruling will be a rise of benefits-denial litigation. Attorneys working on be-
half of plan sponsors should prepare to defend claims under de novo re-
view.
-Nick Domitrovich
IV. McKINNON v. WESTERN SUGAR COOPERATIVE CORP.14 2
The Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to liberal
rules of pleading in the recent case McKinnon v. Western Sugar Coopera-
tive Corp. The plaintiff, an employee of Western Sugar Cooperative Corp.
("Western Sugar"), was injured in the course of his work when a railcar
accident amputated both his legs on February 15, 2005.143 He received
workers' compensation benefits. 44 McKinnon then sued Western Sugar,
claiming the statutory exception to workers' compensation exclusivity ap-
plied because Western Sugar's conduct both caused his injuries and was
intentional.1 45 The Court allowed the case to advance to discovery, even
though McKinnon appeared to have little chance of ultimately satisfying the
requirements for an exclusivity exception.
McKinnon argued that Western Sugar's conduct was intentional and
deliberate because it had an "ongoing policy and practice of moving railcars
in an uncontrolled manner, without necessary safety equipment."'146 Mc-
Kinnon contended that this practice was certain to eventually injure an em-
ployee and that Western Sugar's deliberate acts resulted in his injuries. 147
McKinnon thus argued he qualified for the exception to workers' compen-
sation exclusivity. 48
The district court granted Western Sugar's motion to dismiss McKin-
non's complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Montana Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).149 The district court held that McKinnon's alle-
gations, if true, did not constitute intentional and deliberate acts that were
intended to injure McKinnon.150 McKinnon appealed,151 putting before the
Montana Supreme Court the question of whether his complaint contained
an adequate "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief," as required by the Montana Rules of Civil
142. McKinnon v. W. Sugar Coop. Corp., 225 P.3d 1221 (Mont. 2010).
143. Id. at 1222.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1224.
147. Id.
148. McKinnon, 225 P.3d 1224.
149. Id. at 1223.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1222.
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Procedure.1 52 The Supreme Court held the claim was sufficient, reversing
the district court in a 4-1 decision.1 53
Generally, workers' compensation is the only remedy available to an
employee injured while performing his or her job duties. 154 However,
Montana law recognizes an exception to the general rule.' 55 The statute is
worth reviewing in its entirety:
(1) If an employee is intentionally injured by an intentional and deliberate act
of the employee's employer or by the intentional and deliberate act of a fel-
low employee while performing the duties of employment, the employee or in
case of death the employee's heirs or personal representatives, in addition to
the right to receive compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act,
have a cause of action for damages against the person whose intentional and
deliberate act caused the intentional injury.
(2) An employer is not vicariously liable under this section for the intentional
and deliberate acts of an employee.
(3) As used in this section, "intentional injury" means an injury caused by an
intentional and deliberate act that is specifically and actually intended to
cause injury to the employee injured and there is actual knowledge that an
injury is certain to occur. 156
The Legislature revised this statute in 2001, changing the standard of em-
ployer conduct necessary to trigger the exemption. 157 Prior to 2001, the
statute required "intentional and malicious" conduct by the employer. 158 In
2000, the Court defined acting with "malice" as intentionally disregarding,
or acting with indifference to, a high probability of employee injury. 15 9 The
Legislature responded by replacing the term "malicious" with "deliberate"
and defining "intentional injury" in subpart three of the statute.1 60
The Legislature specifically noted that the changes were made in re-
sponse to the Montana Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Sherner v. Co-
noco, Inc.161 In Sherner, a refinery worker alleged that he was injured by
noxious gas while cleaning a tank that had not been adequately cleared of
fumes.' 62 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant,
but the Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the "inten-
152. Mont. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
153. McKinnon, 225 P.3d at 1224, 1226.
154. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-411 (2009).
155. Id. at § 39-71-413.
156. Id.
157. McKinnon, 225 P.3d at 1223; see also Wise v. CNH Am., LLC, 142 P.3d 774, 776 (Mont. 2006).
158. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-413 (2000).
159. Sherner v. Conoco, 995 P.2d 990, 998 (Mont. 2000).
160. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-413 (2001); Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-413 (1999).
161. 2001 Mont. Laws Ch. 229 (Preamble); see also Wise, 142 P.3d at 776.
162. Sherner, 995 P.2d at 992-993.
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tional and malicious" standard, the plaintiff had established genuine issues
of fact.163
The Montana Supreme Court first seriously examined the effect of the
legislative revision on pleading standards in the 2006 case Wise v. CNH
America, LLC.' 64 In Wise, the Court upheld dismissal.' 65 Thus, the Court's
discussion in McKinnon focused primarily on distinguishing McKinnon
from Wise. In Wise, the plaintiff was injured while operating heavy equip-
ment at work. 166 He sued his employer and the equipment manufacturer,
explicitly pleading negligence based on allegations that his employer failed
to provide safe working conditions and failed to comply with industry regu-
lations and safety measures. 167 The district court dismissed for failure to
state a claim,168 and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed in a unanimous
decision. 169 Although the plaintiff in Wise argued his employer's allegedly
negligent actions amounted to "intentional and deliberate" acts, the Court
held the alleged acts amounted to no more than ordinary negligence, and the
plaintiff could prove no set of facts that would entitle him to recover be-
yond workers' compensation benefits. 170
While the claims in McKinnon were similar to those in Wise, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court identified a critical difference. The Court stated that
Wise's complaint never connected the defendant's alleged negligence to in-
tentional and deliberate conduct, but McKinnon's claim did allege specific
intentional and deliberate acts on the part of Western Sugar. 7 1 The Court
held that the distinction was enough to entitle the plaintiff to develop his
case through discovery.1 72 The Court reaffirmed that "[t]his Court does not
favor the short circuiting of litigation at the initial pleading stage unless a
complaint does not state a cause of action under any set of facts. 1' 73
In a lone dissent, Justice Rice argued the complaint failed to state a
claim under Montana Code Annotated § 39-71-411. He reasoned that Mc-
Kinnon alleged only that Western Sugar's acts were intentional but failed to
allege that Western Sugar "also acted with the specific and actual intention
to cause resulting injury to McKinnon," as required by the statute. 174 Quot-
163. Id. at 999.
164. Wise v. CNH Am., LLC, 142 P.3d 774 (Mont. 2006).
165. Id. at 777.
166. Id. at 775.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 777.
170. Wise, 142 P.3d at 777.
171. Id.
172. McKinnon, 225 P.3d at 1224.
173. Id. (quoting Willson v. Taylor, 634 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Mont. 1981); Tobacco River Lbr. Co. v.
Yoppe, 577 P.2d 855, 857 (Mont. 1978)).
174. Id. at 1226 (J. Rice, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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ing the district court, Rice stated that "without using the word negligence,
McKinnon has alleged a negligence claim against Western Sugar. 11 75 The
majority countered that the dissent's argument "attenuates the basic princi-
ples of notice pleading," and that the Court could not "say beyond doubt
that McKinnon can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief under these circumstances."1 76
McKinnon demonstrates the Montana Supreme Court will refuse to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless there is no conceiva-
ble set of facts that would support the complaint. Comparing McKinnon to
Wise, it appears the Court will allow a plaintiff seeking to recover under the
exemption to workers' compensation exclusivity to reach discovery so long
as he or she pleads a legally cognizable claim. This adherence to the liberal
standard is particularly noteworthy because it contrasts with the higher
"plausibility standard" adopted by the United States Supreme Court in re-
cent years.' 77 McKinnon suggests the Montana Supreme Court does not
intend to follow the federal system's lead in demanding more from the short
and plain statement.
-Zach Franz
V. NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE V. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
17 8
The Montana Supreme Court recently held that the federal Clean
Water Act ("CWA") requires states to enforce pre-discharge treatment of all
groundwater discharge resulting from coal bed methane ("CBM") extrac-
tion.179 The Northern Cheyenne Tribe, a federally recognized Indian tribe,
Tongue River Water Users' Association, and Northern Plains Resource
Council ("Appellants") challenged two permits issued to Fidelity Explora-
tion & Production Company ("Fidelity") allowing discharge of untreated
and partially untreated groundwater into the Tongue River.1 80 The Court
determined that the CWA requires CBM extractors to use the best-available
technology to treat all wastewater before discharge. 8t l Reversing the dis-
175. Id. at 1227 (J. Rice, dissenting).
176. Id. at 1224.
177. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs must allege facts to
make a claim for relief plausible rather than merely conceivable); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (explaining that the plausibility standard requires the plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to
allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is responsible for the alleged miscon-
duct).
178. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51 (Mont. 2010).
179. Id. at 58.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 55.
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trict court's decision, the Court unanimously held that Montana's Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") must enforce the best-available
technology requirement when issuing discharge permits.182 As a result, the
Court voided both of Fidelity's discharge permits.' 83
Companies such as Fidelity extract CBM, a form of natural gas, for
commercial sale.' 84 CBM is found in coal seams and is naturally trapped
by groundwater pressure.' 85 To release and capture CBM, producers ex-
tract significant amounts of groundwater and then must dispose of it.186
Groundwater extracted for this purpose has a high saline content and has
been designated a "pollutant" under federal law. 187 Fidelity discharged
wastewater under two permits issued by DEQ. 188 The first, issued in 2000
and renewed in 2004, did not include a treatment requirement. 189 Under
this permit, Fidelity released almost seven million pounds of sodium and 17
million pounds of salts into the Tongue River each year.190 A second per-
mit, issued in 2006, allowed Fidelity to discharge additional wastewater.' 9 '
This permit required Fidelity to treat a portion of the groundwater, "blend"
it with untreated groundwater, and then discharge it into the Tongue
River.' 92 Fidelity had facilities on site which would have allowed it to treat
all of the groundwater. 93
Appellants are all Tongue River water users. 194 Northern Cheyenne
Tribe holds water rights in the Tongue River which it uses for domestic,
work, and cultural activities.' 95 Members of the Tongue River Water Users
Association and the Northern Plains Resource Council extract water from
the Tongue River for irrigation, stockwater, and domestic use. 196 Each
group relies on the high-quality water of the Tongue River.' 97
Because saline groundwater has been designated a pollutant, the EPA
regulates CBM discharges into surface waters through the National Pollu-
182. Id. at 58.
183. Id.
184. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 52.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing N. Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1160
(9th Cir. 2003)).
188. Id. at 53.
189. Id.
190. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 52.
191. Id. at 53.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 52.
195. Id.
196. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 52.
197. Id.
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tant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting program.' 98 To
receive a NPDES permit, companies must abide by conditions and limita-
tions on pollutant discharge defined by the EPA.199 The EPA Administra-
tor ("Administrator") may promulgate NPDES standards in two ways: (1)
by establishing "guidelines for an entire class of industry," or (2) by setting
"effluent limitations geared to the particular exigency of an individual per-
mit. ' '2° ° The EPA has yet to implement national guidelines for treating
CBM wastewater. 201 In the absence of specific guidelines, § 301 of the
CWA requires the EPA to implement pre-discharge treatment.20 2 Further,
§ 306 requires the use of the best-available technology. 20 3 To determine
what methods and instruments constitute best-available technology, the Ad-
ministrator must use his or her "best professional judgment. ' '204 In the ab-
sence of industry-wide standards, the EPA establishes effluent limitations
on a case-by-case basis.20 5
The EPA administers NPDES permits unless a state gets approval to
enact its own enforcement. 20 6 Montana received EPA approval to adminis-
ter its own program through the DEQ. 20 7 The DEQ requires Montana com-
panies to obtain Montana Pollutant Discharge Eliminations System
("MPDES") permits instead of NPDES permits.20 8
The DEQ issued permits to Fidelity based upon "tolerable effects" of
pollutant discharge rather than uniform pre-discharge treatment stan-
dards. 20 9 The DEQ determined what portion of the extracted groundwater
had to be treated by calculating the downstream effect of the discharge on
electric conductivity and sodium absorption ratio.210 The DEQ based its
treatment requirement on the Montana Board of Environmental Review's
estimate of "nonsignifican[t]" levels of electric conductivity and sodium ab-
sorption ratio.211 Appellants argued that this violated § 301 of the CWA
requiring pre-discharge treatment of all wastewater and § 306 requiring the
use of the best-available technology.212
198. Id. at 58.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 55.
201. Id.
202. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 56.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 55.
205. Id. (citing Texas Oil & Gas Assn. v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir.1998)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 52-53.
208. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 53.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 54.
212. Id.; Br. of Appellant at 25, N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51
(Mont. 2010).
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The DEQ argued four points to the Montana Supreme Court.213 First,
DEQ argued that the EPA Administrator-the person responsible for issu-
ing NPDES permits-had discretionary authority to require pre-discharge
treatment standards. 214 Second, the DEQ claimed that the Administrator
lacked the authority to enforce case-by-case pre-discharge treatment stan-
dards.215 Third, the DEQ asserted that permit writers for the states did not
"stand in the shoes" of the Administrator and were not required to abide by
the same standards. 216 Finally, the DEQ claimed that the MPDES permits
issued to Fidelity did not violate the CWA because they were "more strin-
gent" than the NPDES standard.217
The Court addressed whether the Administrator had discretion to en-
force pre-discharge treatment. 218 Rebutting the DEQ's claim, the Court
noted that Congress amended the NPDES in 1972 to ensure pre-discharge
treatment.21 9 This amendment followed a Congressional report noting the
ineffectiveness of post-discharge water quality standards. 220 The Court
pointed out that although the language of § 402(a)(1) appears discretionary,
§§ 402 and 301 must be analyzed together. 221 Section 402 states that the
Administrator may issue pollutant discharge permits, but § 301 enumerates
conditions and limitations that each permit must contain.222 Section 301
requires the Administrator to implement pre-discharge treatment standards
for permits issued under § 402.223 Therefore, the Court concluded that to
comply with the CWA, NPDES permits must require CBM producers to
treat all groundwater before it is discharged. 224
Turning to the DEQ's next argument, the Court considered whether the
Administrator had authority to develop pre-discharge treatment standards
on a case-by-case basis. 225 The DEQ relied on Washington v. EPA,226 a
prior Ninth Circuit decision which held that the Administrator lacked the
authority. 227 However, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the
EPA had subsequently passed an administrative rule invalidating Washing-
213. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 56, 58.
214. Id. at 56.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 57.
217. Id. at 57-58.
218. Id. at 55.
219. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 55.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 56.
222. ld.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 56-57.
226. Wash. v. EPA, 573 F. 2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978).
227. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 56-57 (citing Wash., 573 F.2d at 592).
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ton. 228 The rule gave authority to both the Administrator and the states to
enforce pre-discharge treatment standards on a case-by-case basis.229 Not-
ing the Regulations' specific invalidation of Washington, the Court found
that the Administrator has authority to implement case-by-case pre-dis-
charge treatment standards. 230
The DEQ also argued that state permitting agencies do not "stand in
the shoes" of the Administrator. 231 However, the Court quickly discounted
this assertion, pointing to a section in the CWA that specifically defines
permit writers as "either the Administrator or a state. ' 232 The Court also
cited a D.C. Circuit Court, National Resource Defense Council v. EPA,
which reached the same conclusion. 233 Therefore, the Court held that the
states must abide by the same standards as the Administrator. 234
Finally, the DEQ argued that MPDES permits issued to Fidelity satis-
fied the CWA because they were more stringent than NPDES permits. 235
The DEQ asserted that water quality standards exceed the best-available
technology standard.236 However, the Court dismissed this assertion as
"hollow." 237 Noting Fidelity's undisputed ability to treat all groundwater
discharge, the Court stated that treating only a portion of the discharge was
clearly less stringent.238 Having determined that Fidelity's permits failed to
meet NPDES standards, the Court held that the DEQ had violated the CWA
and declared Fidelity's discharge permits void.239
Northern Cheyenne Tribe is significant because it declares that in the
absence of EPA guidelines, the DEQ must enforce provisions of the CWA
requiring pre-discharge treatment of wastewater using the best-available
technology. A lawyer practicing in Montana should be aware that a com-
pany seeking an MPDES permit in Montana will have to abide by this stan-
dard.
-Sterling Laudon
228. Id. (citing Wash., 573 F.2d 583).
229. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 (1979)).
230. Id. at 57 (citing Washington, 573 F.2d 583).
231. Id.
232. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c) (1979)).
233. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 57 (citing Natl. Resource Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156
(D.C.Cir.1988)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 57-58.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 58.
238. Id.
239. N. Cheyenne Tribe, 234 P.3d at 58.
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VI. IN RE THE MENTAL HEALTH OF L.R. 2 40
In re the Mental Health of L.R. articulated how courts should apply
conflicting statutes concerning the involuntary medication of a mentally ill
person. 241 The statutes at issue in this case are inconsistent because treat-
ment for a person in an emergency situation under Montana Code Anno-
tated § 53-21-129(2) (2009) may include medication, and the time period
for such treatment could overlap with the 24-hour period a person may re-
fuse medication under § 53-21 115(11).242 In the case at issue, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court held that a mental health patient's statutory rights were
not violated even though she was involuntarily medicated less than 24 hours
prior to her initial hearing. 243
L.R.'s involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital oc-
curred after Powell County law enforcement officers observed L.R. act ab-
normally on several occasions. 244 On August 3, 2009, officers received a
call from L.R.'s daughter reporting that L.R. was lying on the ground
outside and not moving.24 5 Officers arrived to find that L.R. was fine.246
Two days later, an officer responded to L.R.'s call reporting that a tree was
on fire, only to find that it was not.247 The next day, the same officer re-
sponded to a Town Pump station where L.R. had stolen a pack of ciga-
rettes. 248 When the officer arrived, L.R. was attempting to flush her clothes
down the toilet. 249 She resisted the officer while being placed into custody,
referring to him as "the devil" and the "President of the United States. '250
When L.R. arrived at the jail on August 6, 2009, a mental health pro-
fessional evaluated her. He concluded that L.R.was unable to make reason-
able decisions for herself and that she required emergency detention at the
Montana State Hospital. 251 That evening and the following day, the State
Hospital medicated L.R. against her will. 252 Reports indicated that L.R.
was "aggressive, intrusive, and volatile during her emergency detention. ' 253
240. In re the Mental Health of L.R., 231 P.3d 594 (Mont. 2010).
241. Id. at 597.
242. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 53-21-129(2), 53-21-115(11) (2009).
243. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 596-597.
244. d at 596.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 596.
250. Id
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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On August 7, 2009, the State filed a petition to commit L.R. involunta-
rily. 254 L.R. attended her initial appearance later that same day. 255
Before her initial appearance, another certified mental health profes-
sional evaluated L.R.256 He reported that L.R. demonstrated hypomanic
bipolar disorder and argumentativeness and that she spoke incessantly, re-
peatedly veered off-topic, denied having a mental illness, and opposed med-
ication. 257 Although the mental health professional concluded that L.R.
was marginally able to provide for her basic needs, he predicted that L.R.'s
condition would soon worsen. 258 The mental health professional concluded
that involuntary commitment was necessary. 2 59
At L.R.'s August 11, 2009 hearing, the district court issued an order
committing L.R. to the Montana State Hospital for 90 days after determin-
ing that her bipolar disorder prevented her from taking care of herself.26°
The District Court also authorized the Montana State Hospital to administer
medication to L.R.26 1 L.R. appealed her involuntary commitment, contend-
ing that her statutory rights were violated when she was involuntarily medi-
cated less than 24 hours prior to her initial hearing on August 7, 2009.262
The Montana Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing that the
statutes relied on by the State and L.R. are inconsistent with one another.263
The State relied on Montana Code Annotated § 53-21-129(2), which pro-
vides that if a professional determines a mentally ill person presents a dan-
ger to that person or others and an emergency situation is present, that per-
son may be detained and treated until the following business day.26 4 The
State contended that § 53-21-129(2) applied to L.R.'s situation because
"substantial credible evidence" indicated she was unable to provide for her
own basic needs and safety.2 65
Conversely, L.R. relied on § 53-21-115(11), which provides that a
person who is involuntarily detained because of a mental illness has the
right to refuse any non-lifesaving medication within 24 hours of a hear-
ing. 26 6 Since L.R.'s involuntary medication occurred on the night of Au-
gust 6, 2009, less than 24 hours before her initial appearance, L.R. claimed
254. Id.
255. In re the Mental Health of L.R., 231 P.3d at 596.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 596.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Mont. Code Ann. § 53-21-129(2).
265. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 596.
266. Id. at 597.
2011
23
et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2011
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
her statutory rights were violated.2 67 In addition, L.R. argued that the dis-
trict court either lacked sufficient detail to support involuntary commitment
or that it based its decision on insufficient evidence.2 68
The Court determined that emergency treatment under
§ 53-21-129(2) includes the use of medication. 269 This finding demon-
strated an inconsistency since § 53-21-129(2) conflicted with the detained
person's right to refuse medication within 24 hours of a hearing under
§ 53-21-115(11).270
The Court noted that district courts are required to "strictly adhere to
statutes in involuntary commitment cases because they involve a loss of
liberty. ' 27t However, the Court noted that when a general statute conflicts
with a more specific statute, the specific statute governs. 272 The Court held
that the statute pertaining to the involuntary medication of a mentally ill
patient during an emergency situation is more specific than the statute pro-
viding the right to refuse medication.2 73 According to the Court, the latter
statute was more general because it applied to all petitions for involuntary
commitment, whereas the statute authorizing involuntary medication was
more specific because it applied to emergency situations such as the one in
this case.
2 7 4
The Court held that since a mental health professional determined that
an emergency situation existed and that L.R. required detainment, the Mon-
tana State Hospital was permitted to medicate L.R. until the next business
day.2 75 The Court determined that L.R. was rightfully medicated although
her initial hearing was also scheduled for that day. 276 Since mental health
professionals determined that medication was appropriate in L.R.'s situa-
tion, the Court refused to question their professional recommendations.2 77
Although it is clear that L.R. required involuntary commitment, neither
the Court nor the State explained why L.R. required medication once she
was detained. The statute relied on by L.R. specifically states that a patient
has the statutory right to refuse non-lifesaving medication the day prior to
any hearing. 278 Mental health professionals concluded that L.R. demon-
267. Id. at 596.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 597.
270. Id. at 597.
271. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 597 (citing In re the Mental Health of J.D.L., 199
P.3d 805 (Mont. 2008)).
272. Id. (citing Mercury Marine v. Monty's Enters., Inc., 892 P.2d 568, 571 (Mont. 1995)).
273. Id. at 597.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. In re the Mental Health of LR., 231 P.3d at 597.
278. Mont. Code Ann. § 53-21-115(11).
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strated bipolar disorder, argumentativeness, and could not provide for her-
self.279 However, nothing in the opinion showed that an emergency situa-
tion existed once L.R. was detained that required her to take lifesaving
medication.
Even though the Court stated it is important to follow the statutes in
involuntary commitment cases since they involve the loss of one's lib-
erty,280 it determined the case based on one statute's specificity rather than
following another that provided rights to a patient. In addition, this holding
reflects the Court's deference to the opinions of mental health professionals
where involuntary commitment is at issue. In re the Mental Health of L.R.
demonstrates that when an attorney is faced with two conflicting statutes,
the most critical task for that attorney will be to convince the Court that the
more favorable statute is also the most specific.
-Katharine Leque
VII. IN RE BESi18 1
In In re Best, the Montana Supreme Court held that the Office of Dis-
ciplinary Counsel ("ODC") cannot discipline an attorney with a private ad-
monition without affording the attorney due process rights.28 2 The Court
additionally held that the Commission on Practice ("COP") cannot, sua
sponte, charge a lawyer with a disciplinary violation not alleged in the ODC
complaint.2 83
On December 22, 2009, the COP issued an order requiring Best to
appear before the Commission on January 21, 2010 to receive a private
admonition. 284 The COP had found that Best violated Montana Rule of
Professional Conduct ("MRPC") § 4.2 (Communication with Person Repre-
sented by Counsel) by sending a letter to the Montana Medical Association
("MMA") seeking assistance in a case even though she knew the MMA's
legal counsel also represented the hospital that Best's client was suing.2 85
Best filed a petition for original jurisdiction and application for injunctive
relief, asking the Court to vacate the private admonition and declare the
COP's attempt to discipline her was a violation of her constitutional rights
to know and to participate in government, and her rights to due process,
279. In re the Mental Health of L.R., 231 P.3d at 596.
280. Id. at 597 (citing In re the Mental Health of J.D.L., 199 P.3d 805 (Mont. 2008)).
281. In re Best, 229 P.3d 1201 (Mont. 2010).
282. Id. at 1205.
283. Id. at 1206.
284. Id. at 1203.
285. Id. at 1202-1203.
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equal protection, and free speech. 286 The Court accepted Best's petition for
original jurisdiction and stayed all future proceedings pending its review of
the matter.287
In June of 2008, Best filed a lawsuit on behalf of a local physician
against a Montana hospital, alleging that a restrictive covenant in the physi-
cian's employment contract was void as contrary to public policy.288 In her
petition before the Montana Supreme Court, Best alleged that after she filed
the lawsuit, several of her client's colleagues encouraged her client to join
the MMA and the American Medical Association ("AMA") because of
their shared opposition of restrictive covenants.289 According to Best, her
client took the advice and joined the MMA in December of 2008.290
Shortly thereafter, Best's client informed her that the attorneys who repre-
sented the MMA also represented the hospital. 291 Best considered this a
potential conflict of interest and wrote a letter to the hospital's attorneys to
address the situation. 292 According to the hospital's attorneys, Best sent the
letter to them on the same day that her client joined the MMA. 293 The
hospital's attorneys later responded by simply providing Best with the
ODC's address. 294
Best believed that the Rules of Professional Conduct compelled her to
report the potential conflict of interest, so she wrote a letter to the ODC and
enclosed both her letter to the hospital's attorneys and their response. 295
Despite the potential conflict of interest, Best proceeded with the litigation
against the hospital. 296 Before the ODC informed Best of its decision, Best
wrote a letter to the MMA seeking assistance in the case "ostensibly be-
cause of the broad significance of the issues in the case to the medical
profession. ' 297 In January of 2009, the ODC informed Best that it had dis-
missed her complaint against the hospital's attorneys, finding there was no
conflict of interest because the attorneys represented the MMA, not its indi-
vidual members. 298 Best did not appeal the ODC's decision.299
286. Id. at 1201-1202.
287. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1202.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1202.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1202.
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In April of 2009, the hospital's attorneys filed a complaint against Best
with the ODC, alleging she had violated MRPC §§ 3.1 (Meritorious Claims
and Contentions), 3.3 (Candor toward the Tribunal), 3.4 (Fairness to Op-
posing Party and Counsel), and 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statement to
Others). 3°° The hospital's attorneys claimed that Best had sent her letter to
the ODC in an attempt to "[cause] difficulties" for them in their relationship
with the MMA.30' The hospital's attorneys argued that Best and her client
"contrived a conflict of interest [to harass] and intimidate" them.302 To
support their contention, the hospital's attorneys emphasized that Best had
sent her letter to them the same day her client joined the MMA.30 3
When the ODC presented the case to the COP's Review Panel, it rec-
ommended the complaint against Best be dismissed with a letter of cau-
tion.3°4 The Review Panel concluded that Best had not violated MRPC
§§ 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, and 4.1, and agreed that those allegations should be dis-
missed. 30 5 However, the Review Panel also concluded that Best had tried
to interfere with the hospital's attorneys and the MMA's attorney-client re-
lationship in violation of MRPC § 4.2.306 As punishment, the Review
Panel recommended that Best receive a private admonition. 30 7 The COP's
Adjudicatory Panel agreed that Best had violated MRPC § 4.2 and ap-
proved the recommendation for a private admonition. 30 8 The COP then is-
sued an order directing Best to appear before it for the admonition.30 9 The
order stated that the COP had reviewed the complaint and the report from
the ODC, and that it had found "just cause" to discipline Best.310
In response to the ODC's ruling, Best petitioned the Montana Supreme
Court to review her case and grant injunctive and declaratory relief.31' Best
asserted that the COP's attempt to discipline her violated her right to due
process, among other rights. 312 Regarding her due process right, Best ar-
gued that she did not have the opportunity to see or present evidence, con-
front or cross-examine witnesses, or appeal the COP's decision. 31 3
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1202-1203.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1203.
305. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1203.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1201, 1204.
312. Id. at 1201-1202.
313. Id. at 1204.
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The COP argued that while Best was not told of the specific grounds
for its decision, an informal disciplinary matter such as Best's only affords
minimal due process rights. 3 14 The ODC insisted that attorneys who are
informally disciplined have minimal due process rights because they are not
at risk of losing their license and the discipline imposed by the COP is not
made public.315 The ODC claimed that Best received adequate due process
because she was given a copy of the informal complaint and had the oppor-
tunity to respond.316
In its opinion, the Court first considered the extent of Best's due pro-
cess rights. 31 7 The Court rejected the ODC's argument that lawyers who
are being informally disciplined have minimal due process rights. Specifi-
cally, the Court stressed that a private admonition is considered a form of
discipline and that a lawyer receiving such discipline may suffer adverse
consequences. 318 The Court noted that the attorney might be charged with
the costs of the hearing and the admonition might be used as justification to
increase discipline in future proceedings. 319 Further, the admonition might
have to be disclosed to malpractice insurance carriers, to other jurisdictions
on pro hac vice, or to other states on admission applications. 320
The Court held that in the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings,
due process requires notice of the alleged misconduct and an opportunity to
be heard.321 Citing the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that a
lawyer subject to attorney disciplinary proceedings must be given fair no-
tice of the reach of the grievance procedure and must be informed of the
precise nature of the charges. 322
The Court held that Best's due process rights had been violated be-
cause the informal complaint did not include any information regarding her
alleged violation of MRPC § 4.2.323 Further, the informal complaint did
not specifically allege that Best had interfered with the attorney-client rela-
tionship between the hospital's attorneys and MMA, the basis for her pur-
ported violation. 32 4 Thus, Best was not properly put on notice of the
charge, nor was she given an opportunity to respond to that charge. 32 5
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. id. at 1205.
317. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1205.
318. Id. at 1204-1205.
319. ld. at 1205.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1204.
322. Id. at 1205(citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968)).
323. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1205.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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The Court additionally held that the COP had exceeded its authority by
charging Best with violating a rule not alleged in the original complaint and
not giving her a chance to respond to the new charge. 326 Citing Rule 1 from
the Montana Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (2002) ("RLDE"),
the Court held that "[pirosecutorial and adjudicatory functions shall be sep-
arated and managed to secure responsiveness, efficiency and fairness." 327
The Court further held that "[niothing in the RLDE permits the COP to act
as a complainant in disciplinary proceedings. ' 328 The Court held that the
COP's combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions was unfair
to Best, and that the COP exceeded its authority by ignoring the ODC's
recommendation, drafting its own complaint, and then acting on it.329
Montana attorneys should take note of this case because it emphasizes
the importance of due process in disciplinary hearings, regardless of the
tribunal. When an individual faces potential punishment for alleged viola-
tions of the law, that person is entitled to due process of the law. A Mon-
tana attorney facing potential discipline for alleged violations of a profes-
sional rule is afforded the same rights. Those rights are not minimized sim-
ply because the potential discipline is "informal."
-Seamus Molloy
VIII. STATE V. MEREDITH330
In State v. Meredith, the Montana Supreme Court held that a person
taken into custody has no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
the statements he or she makes while alone in a police interrogation
room. 331 Therefore, law enforcement's warrantless recording of such state-
ments without the person's knowledge does not constitute a search in Mon-
tana.332
Meredith arose over a homicide that took place in Great Falls, Mon-
tana on July 29, 2006.3 33 A landlord reported to the Great Falls Police
Department that two girls had found the naked body of a deceased woman
in the alley behind his apartment complex in downtown Great Falls. 334 The
landlord and a tenant had then discovered the body themselves and re-
326. Id. at 1206.
327. Id. at 1205.
328. Id.
329. In re Best, 229 P.3d at 1205-1206.
330. State v. Meredith, 226 P.3d 571 (Mont. 2010).
331. Id. at 580.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 574.
334. Id.
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mained in the alley until the police arrived. 335 Officers later determined
that the woman had received multiple stab wounds and a cut to the
throat.336 While waiting for the police, the landlord and tenant witnessed a
man drive a van into the alley and repeatedly ask about a lost dog. 3 3 7 The
driver then exited the van and walked towards the woman's body.338 The
two men found this odd and reported the suspicious activity to the police. 339
The police learned that Gene Richard Meredith owned the van. 340
When officers could not locate Meredith, they went to his girlfriend's
house.34' The girlfriend, Debra Bailey, met the officers at the door and
immediately explained that Meredith told her he had killed someone the
night before.342 Meredith emerged from the house, and officers took him
into custody.343
Officers transported Meredith to the police station and placed him in
an interrogation room. 344 Before being interviewed, Meredith sat alone in
the police interrogation room and said the following: "They got me. By
what I said to Debby, they got me. How did they find my van so
quickly?" 345 At trial, the State used this incriminating statement and addi-
tional evidence to link Meredith to the woman's murder.346 A jury found
Meredith guilty of deliberate homicide; he was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.347
Meredith appealed to the Montana Supreme Court for three reasons;34 8
the Court's ruling on the third issue set an important precedent. This issue
directly pertained to whether Meredith was denied effective assistance of
counsel. 349 However, it led the Court into an in-depth discussion regarding
the legality of recording Meredith's incriminating statements while he was
alone in the police interrogation room and unaware that his statements were
being recorded.350
335. Id.
336. Meredith, 226 P.3d at 574.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 574-575.
342. Meredith, 226 P.3d at 575.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. ld. at 580-581.
347. Id. at 575-576.
348. Meredith, 226 P.3d at 574.
349. Id. at 579.
350. Id. at 579-580.
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Relying on State v. Goetz,35 1 Meredith claimed the State violated his
privacy and performed an unreasonable search by recording his statements
without his knowledge or a warrant.352 In response, the Court reviewed its
decision in Goetz, explaining that a search occurs when the government
retrieves evidence in a manner that violates an individual's "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" if society is willing to recognize that expectation as
"objectively reasonable. '353 In Goetz, the Court considered whether an un-
reasonable search occurs when law enforcement officers have a confidential
informant wear a body wire to electronically record the informant's conver-
sations with others about a drug transaction.354 Applying the law to the
facts, the Court determined that "[t]he warrantless electronic monitoring
and recording of face-to-face conversations with the consent of one of the
participants violates the other participants' right to privacy and to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article II, §§ 10 and
11 of the Montana Constitution." 355
In the present case, Meredith made statements while alone in a police
interrogation room.356 Nothing and no one provoked him into making any
statements at that time.357 Further, interrogation rooms by their very nature
are not private and are usually monitored through the use of transparent
glass as well as an audio recording system. 358 Based on these facts, the
Court concluded that, although Meredith may have felt a subjective expec-
tation of privacy when he made the incriminating statements, society is not
willing to recognize his expectation as objectively reasonable. 359 If Mere-
dith wanted privacy, he would not have made incriminating statements in
such a room. 360 The Court suggested he wanted to be overheard. 361 In
sum, a search did not occur because no "objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy" exists within the confines of an interrogation room.362
Meredith is significant because it further defines what constitutes a
search under the Montana Constitution. In the future, practitioners should
be aware that the undisclosed and warrantless recording of persons in cus-
tody and placed in police interrogation rooms will not be considered a
351. State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
352. Meredith, 226 P.3d at 580.
353. Id. (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 497).
354. Id. (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 492).
355. Id. (citing Goetz, 191 P.3d at 489).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Meredith, 226 P.3d at 580.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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search in Montana. Such recordings will not implicate the privacy protec-
tions found in Article II, § 10 of the Montana Constitution.
-Hanna Schantz
IX. MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS AsSOCIATION V. STATE
3 6 3
In Montana Shooting Sports Association v. State, the Montana Su-
preme Court held that Montana Code Annotated § 87-2-202 does not im-
plicate a citizen's right to privacy as protected by Article II, § 10 of the
Montana Constitution. 364 That statute requires hunters, anglers, and trap-
pers to include the last four digits of their social security numbers ("SSNs")
and other personal information when submitting conservation license appli-
cations to the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
("FWP").365 The Court affirmed the district court's ruling,366 but applied a
different level of review. 367 The district court applied strict scrutiny to the
case because it determined that § 87-2-202 implicates individuals' funda-
mental right to privacy. 368 The Supreme Court, however, applied the less
stringent rational-basis standard because it determined that individuals'
constitutional right to informational privacy is not implicated when state
legislation requires them to submit their SSNs to a state organization. 369
The Court held that. the State was merely pursuing legitimate state interests
rationally related to the purpose of § 87-2-202, and affirmed the case on
those grounds. 370
Section 87-2-202 was amended in 1999 to require the submission of
conservation-license applicants' SSNs in response to stringent federal re-
quirements adopted to "remedy ineffective enforcement and collection of
child support. '371 In 1996, the United States Congress authorized funding
for the creation of state-run public assistance programs, but in turn required
states to collect the SSNs of applicants for various types of licenses. 372
These measures were designed to allow states to quickly locate and with-
hold money from parents who owe child support. 373 In 1997, Congress
extended this requirement to "recreational licenses," a classification that the
363. Mont. Shooting Sports Assn. v. State, 224 P.3d 1240 (Mont. 2010).
364. Id. at 1246.
365. Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-202(1) (2009).
366. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1241.
367. Id. at 1246.
368. Id. at 1243.
369. Id. at 1246.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1242.
372. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at1242.
373. Id.
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Montana Legislature subsequently interpreted as including conservation li-
censes 374-a prerequisite for Montana hunting, fishing, and trapping li-
censes.
375
By complying with this federal legislation and requiring hunters, fish-
ers, and trappers to submit their SSNs when applying for conservation li-
censes, the State of Montana annually receives significant benefits that di-
rectly support the "development and well-being" of children in the state. 376
For example, the Child Support Enforcement Division ("CSED") annually
receives $5.6 million in federal aid. 377 This allowed CSED to recover $65
million of back-child-support payments in 2008.378 Furthermore, CSED
has access to federal databases to help locate parents who owe child-support
payments. 379 Finally, compliance with this federal legislation led to the
creation of Montana's Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program,
which annually receives $38 million in federal funding; this support allows
the program to provide basic services to over 3,000 families in Montana. 380
Despite the seemingly incongruous relationship between conservation li-
censes and unpaid child support, Montana's compliance with this federal
legislation provides a direct benefit to the children of this state. 381
Montana Shooting Sports arose when the plaintiffs-a non-profit or-
ganization called Montana Shooting Sports Association ("MSSA") that rep-
resents firearms and hunting enthusiasts-grew concerned that its members
were being forced to disclose the last four digits of their SSNs to comply
with § 87-2-202.382 MSSA provided examples of members who were no
longer willing to purchase hunting licenses in Montana, fearing that the last
four digits of their SSNs-and potentially, MSSA argued, their identities-
could be stolen once FWP came into possession of that personal informa-
tion.383 MSSA asserted that its members' constitutional and fundamental
right to privacy was being violated.384
Under the Montana Constitution, the right of privacy is a "fundamental
right," which includes an individual's right to "control the disclosure and
circulation of personal information. ' 385 Specifically, Article II, § 10 of the
Montana Constitution states that the "right of individual privacy is essential
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1246.
376. Id. at 1243.
377. Id.
378. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1243.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1242-1243.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1243.
383. Id.
384. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1241.
385. Id. at 1244.
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to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest. ' 386 The Court "jealously" guards
these privacy rights,387 which are among the "most stringent protections" in
the country. 388 Personal information is protected by this right to privacy if:
"(1) the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the
information, and (2) that expectation is reasonable. '389
The level of review applied by a court in an opinion indicates whether
a court believes a fundamental right may have been violated. 390 The Court
has held that when fundamental rights could be affected, strict scrutiny
must be applied; when the rights affected are not fundamental, rational ba-
sis is applied instead.391 In Montana Shooting Sports, the district court ap-
plied a strict scrutiny level of review, indicating that if § 87-2-202 violated
any individual rights, then those rights were fundamental in nature and such
a violation would implicate the fundamental right to privacy found in the
Montana Constitution. 392 However, even though the majority of the
Court's opinion analyzed whether the plaintiffs' fundamental rights were
violated, the Court-upon finding that no fundamental protections were im-
plicated by the case-ultimately applied rational-basis review. 393 The
Court then affirmed the district court by holding that § 87-2-202 was ra-
tionally related to legitimate state interests. 394 In doing so, the Court held
that when individuals are required to submit their SSNs to a state agency,
the forced disclosure of that personal information is not protected by the
right to privacy in the Montana Constitution.395
The Court determined that the plaintiffs' expectation of privacy was
unreasonable and thus failed the second prong of the constitutional test
adopted in BuMs. 396 The Court came to this conclusion for two reasons.
First, the Court found that a SSN "is a piece of information 'that citizens
regularly provide to government entities."' 397 The Court then cited a wide
variety of state statutes that require citizens to submit their SSNs for licens-
ing applications or other state services. 398 Among the statutes cited were
386. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
387. State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971, 980 (Mont. 1997).
388. State v. Bums, 830 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Mont. 1992).
389. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1244 (citing Burns, 830 P.2d at 1321).
390. Wiser v. State, 129 P.3d 133, 138 (Mont. 2006).
391. Id. at 138.
392. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1243.
393. Id. at 1246.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1244.
397. Id. (citing Mich. Dept. of State v. U.S., 166 F.Supp.2d 1228 (W.D. Mich. 2001)).
398. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1244.
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those regarding applications for marriage licenses, 399 law-enforcement pur-
poses, 4°° tax purposes, 4 1 and court-ordered paternity tests.402 The Court's
logic, seemingly circular in nature, supposed that once the State routinely
asks for personal information, that personal information loses any funda-
mental privacy protections previously provided by Article II, § 10 of the
Montana Constitution.4°3 Second, the Court determined that MSSA's ex-
pectation of privacy regarding the last four digits of their SSNs was unrea-
sonable because a SSN, by nature, is a personal identification number as-
signed by the government, a classification that distinguishes SSNs from
purely personal information such as an individual's financial records. 4°4
The Court noted that this distinction, combined with the security provisions
found in § 87-2-202(5) (prohibiting the State from disclosing the SSNs)
and § 87-2-202(6) (requiring the State to delete the SSNs after a period of
five years), indicate that any expectation of privacy regarding a SSN re-
quirement on a license application is unreasonable. 405
After finding that § 87-2-202 does not implicate any fundamental
rights, the Court applied rational-basis scrutiny and determined that the stat-
ute is rationally related to a "legitimate government interest."406 The Court
justified this conclusion by pointing to the multitude of benefits Montana
currently receives that are contingent on Montana's compliance with federal
legislation requiring the disclosure of SSNs on licensing applications.40 7
Montana Shooting Sports is unique in that it marks a distinct departure
from the Court's policy of "jealously" guarding the individual privacy
rights found in the Montana Constitution. By applying rational-basis re-
view, rather than strict scrutiny, the Court held that the collection of infor-
mation commonly required by state organizations, as well as of personal
information created by the government, might not implicate an individual's
fundamental right to privacy in Montana. Therefore, in those situations, a
citizen's only privacy protections are the good faith of the Montana legisla-
ture and the Court's application of rational-basis review to challenged legis-
lation. Privacy advocates and Montana citizens should note, however, that
the holding in Montana Shooting Sports applies only to the collection, and
not to the disclosure, of personal information.40 8
399. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-107(1)(a)).
400. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-504(3)(b)).
401. Id. (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 15-1-201(1)(b)).
402. Id. at 1245 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 40-5-226(12)(a)).
403. Id. at 1244.
404. Mont. Shooting Sports, 224 P.3d at 1245.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1246.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1245.
2011
35
et al.: Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2011
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
When applying Montana Shooting Sports in future cases, practitioners
should emphasize the unique, governmental characteristics inherent to a so-
cial security number to distinguish SSNs from other personal information
commonly required by state organizations. Otherwise, Montana Shooting
Sports could serve as an unfortunate step down a slippery slope in which
citizens lose the fundamental privacy protections of any personal informa-
tion that is routinely required by state statutes. That would certainly run
contrary to the Court's stated policy of "jealously" guarding privacy
rights.4 09 However, if the holding in Montana Shooting Sports is limited to
personal information that originates with the government, purely personal
information would still be safeguarded by Article II, § 10 of the Montana
Constitution.
-John Semmens
X. ALEXANDER V. BOZEMAN MOTORS, INC.4 1 0
In Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, the Montana Supreme Court created
a three-part test to determine whether allegations of an "intentional injury"
are sufficient to avoid the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act ("WCA"). 41 The Court held that "deliberate and intentional con-
duct may be inferred from factual allegations indicating that an employer
knew an employee was being harmed, failed to warn the employee of the
harm, and intentionally continued to expose the employee to the harm. '4 12
The decision provides injured workers a roadmap to avoid the exclusivity
provision of the WCA.
Two employees brought claims against their employer, Bozeman Mo-
tors, alleging they were injured from the inhalation of carbon monoxide and
propane fumes during their employment. 41 3 Burt Ostermiller and Mike Al-
exander ("the Employees") were stationed in a 12' by 24' prefabricated
satellite office of Bozeman Motors.4 14 A propane stove provided the sole
source of heat for the office. 4 15 After the stove was installed, Ostermiller
complained there was an odor in the office and that it was making him
ill.416 In November 2003, Ostermiller lost consciousness in the office and
did not return to his employment with Bozeman Motors. 4 17 Sometime
409. State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971, 980 (Mont. 1997).
410. Alexander v. Bozeman Motors, Inc., 234 P.3d 880 (Mont. 2010).
411. Id. at 889.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 883.
414. Id. at 882-883.
415. Id.
416. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 883.
417. Id.
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around November 2003, Alexander began working for Bozeman Motors
and was stationed in the same office.4t8 Like Ostermiller, Alexander com-
plained of an odor and physical illness while working in the office and
eventually was unable to return to work due to illness.41 9
The Employees were diagnosed as "suffering from chronic effects of
acute and chronic workplace exposures to a faulty ventless space heater
. "... ,420 They filed suit against Bozeman Motors in 2006, alleging negli-
gence, intentional battery, and negligent infliction of emotional distress for
their exposure to carbon monoxide and propane fumes.42'
Generally, the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for an employee
injured in the scope of his or her employment. 422 However, under Montana
Code Annotated § 39-71-413(1), an employee may bring an additional ac-
tion against an employer if the "employee is intentionally injured by an
intentional and deliberate act of [his or her] employer .... 1423 An "inten-
tional injury" is defined as "an injury caused by an intentional and deliber-
ate act that is specifically and actually intended to cause injury to the em-
ployee injured and there is actual knowledge that an injury is certain to
occur.1
4 2 4
Here, the Employees alleged that Alexander was being harmed by the
fumes and that Bozeman Motors had actual knowledge of the harm posed
by the propane stove because the Employees had lodged similar complaints
and Ostermiller had lost consciousness in the office.425 In addition, they
asserted that Bozeman Motors conducted no investigation into the stove and
failed to warn Alexander of the potential dangers of working in the of-
fice.4 2 6
The District Court for Gallatin County granted Bozeman Motors' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Employees' claims were
barred by the exclusivity provision of the WCA. 427 The district court deter-
mined that the Employees' claims "failed to show that Bozeman Motors
had deliberately intended to cause specific harm to [the Employees]. ''428
The district court concluded that "at best, the Employees had demonstrated
that Bozeman Motors' conduct and omissions amounted to wanton negli-
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 884.
423. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-413(1) (2009).
424. Id. at § 39-71-413(3).
425. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 889.
426. Id. at 883.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 884.
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gence .... *429 As a matter of law, wanton negligence was insufficient to
avoid the WCA's exclusivity provision under Calcaterra v. Montana Re-
sources.430 The Employees appealed on the grounds that they had submit-
ted sufficient evidence demonstrating that Bozeman Motors had intention-
ally injured them. 431
The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district
court's decision with respect to Alexander's claim.432 The Court disagreed
with the district court's finding that the Employees' allegations were insuf-
ficient to avoid the exclusivity provision of the WCA.4 33 The Court found
that the Employees' allegations, if true, created a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Alexander suffered an intentional injury.434
The Court's holding clarifies a recent amendment to the definition of
"intentional injury" under Montana Code Annotated § 39-71-413(3).435 In
2001, the Montana Legislature revised § 39-71-413 by removing the term
"malicious" and narrowing the meaning of "intentional injury. ' 4 3 6 The
Court first applied these new definitions in Wise v. CNH America, LLC.4 37
The Court held that Wise failed to assert sufficient factual allegations to
show that the conduct at issue was "intentional" and "deliberate. '4 38 Thus,
Alexander marks the Court's first discussion of factual allegations that it
found to be sufficient to avoid the WCA's current exclusivity provision.
To clarify the definition of intentional injury, the Court analogized the
intent component to that used in criminal law. 439 The Court determined
that the requirement "may undoubtedly be inferred from the facts and cir-
cumstances, and direct proof that the employer intended to cause an inten-
tional injury is not required . . . ."44 Specifically, the Court held:
[I]ntentional conduct may be inferred from factual allegations indicating that
[1] an employer knew an employee was being harmed, [2] failed to warn the
employee of the harm, and [3] intentionally continued to expose the employee
to the harm. Additionally, as required under the plain language of
429. Id.
430. Id. (citing Calcaterra v. Mont. Resources, 962 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1998), rev'd on other grounds,
Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose's Saloon, Inc., 166 P.3d 451 (Mont. 2007)).
431. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 884.
432. Id. at 889. The Court determined that summary judgment with respect to Ostermiller's claim
was proper because Ostermiller could not demonstrate that Bozeman Motors had actual knowledge of
the certainty that he would be injured.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 886.
436. Id. at 887.
437. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 886-887.
438. Wise v. CNH Am., LLC, 142 P.3d 774, 777 (Mont. 2006).
439. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 887.
440. d.
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§ 39-71-413(3), MCA, the employee must allege and demonstrate that the
employer had "actual knowledge" of the certainty of injury.44 1
With its holding, the Court promulgated a new standard defining the factual
allegations necessary to avoid the exclusivity provision of the WCA.
Justice Rice dissented from the majority view, arguing that Alexander
did not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate an intentional injury.442 He
opined: "At most, this alleged conduct establishes aggravated negligence in
failing to provide a safe working environment . . . . 443 Justice Rice pre-
dicted that many personal injury actions will arise in Workers' Compensa-
tion cases by "open[ing] the door for personal injury actions where the de-
fendant's conduct rises to a level of gross negligence . .. ."444
The Alexander decision demonstrates the Court's desire to permit in-
creased access to additional remedies for injured workers beyond those tra-
ditionally provided by the WCA. Montana courts may now analyze inten-
tional injuries under a negligence standard, as Justice Rice asserted in his
dissent. By allowing instances of gross negligence to rise to the level of
intentional conduct, the Court has made it easier for injured workers to re-
cover for intentional injuries. No longer will all cases of wanton negligence
on behalf of employers be dismissed for failing to avoid the exclusivity
provision of the WCA as was the case under Calcaterra. Therefore, the
Alexander decision is a victory for injured workers who now have an in-
structive ruling as a guide in seeking additional compensation for inten-
tional injuries.
The Montana practitioner should be aware that there is now both fac-
tual precedent and a test in place to determine the sufficiency of allegations
to avoid the exclusivity provision of the WCA for intentional injuries.
Though the Court has made it easier to recover for intentional injuries,
workers still face a high standard under Alexander. Only in cases of ex-
treme wanton negligence will injured workers be able to avoid the exclusiv-
ity provision of the WCA. However, it remains to be seen whether the
Alexander ruling will, as Justice Rice predicted, open the courts to many
new claims for intentional injuries. 445 In any event, the Court has clarified
an important area of Montana law and provided injured workers improved
access to an additional remedy beyond the WCA.
-John Sullivan
441. Id. at 889.
442. Id. at 890 (Rice, J., dissenting).
443. Id. at 892.
444. Id.
445. Alexander, 234 P.3d at 892 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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XI. PPL MONTANA, LLC v. STATE4 4 6
In PPL Montana, LLC v. State, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a
district-court ruling that PPL Montana, LLC ("PPL") owed the State of
Montana ("State" or "Montana") over $40 million for use of state-owned
riverbeds used for hydroelectric power production from 2000 to 2007.447
While the Court ultimately reviewed six issues, this short focuses on the
role of navigability in determining title to Montana's riverbeds and the cal-
culation of damages for their unauthorized use.
On December 17, 1999, Delaware-based PPL purchased hydroelectric
facilities on the Clark Fork, Missouri, and Madison Rivers from the Mon-
tana Power Company. 448 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") licensed the facilities under the Federal Power Act ("FPA"). 44 9
Neither Montana Power nor PPL had previously compensated Montana for
use of the riverbeds.450 PPL operated as a wholesale electricity generator,
exempt from state public utility regulations. 451
On June 18, 2004, Montana joined a federal suit filed by parents of
Montana schoolchildren seeking compensation for PPL's use of state river-
beds under the theory that the riverbeds are school-trust lands. 452 With that
action pending, PPL filed a complaint in Montana's First Judicial District
requesting a declaratory judgment barring the State from seeking compen-
sation for PPL's use of riverbeds at its FERC-licensed facilities.453 PPL
argued state claims under the Hydroelectric Resources Act were preempted
by the "federal navigational servitude" 454 and the Federal Power Act.455
The federal cause of action was dismissed as lacking subject-matter juris-
diction.456
Montana counterclaimed, "seeking a declaration that PPL must com-
pensate the State for its" current and past use of state lands under the Hy-
droelectric Resources Act.45 7 The State claimed that the equal-footing doc-
446. PPL Mont., LLC v. State, 229 P.3d 421 (Mont. 2010).
447. Id.
448. Id. at 426.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 427.
451. Id. at 426 n. I (discussing State, Dept. of Revenue v. PPL Mont., LLC, 172 P.3d 1241 (Mont.
2007)).
452. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 426-427.
453. Id. at 427.
454. "The 'federal navigational servitude' is the power of the United States Congress to ensure that
navigable rivers remain open to interstate and foreign commerce. This servitude applies to navigable
rivers acquired by states upon their entrance into the Union, and extends to all state-owned lands below
the high-water mark." Id. at 428.
455. Id. at 427.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 428.
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trine458 granted Montana title to the beds and banks of the Missouri, Clark
Fork and Madison Rivers dating from its statehood. 459 The equal-footing
doctrine evolved to grant new states sovereign title similar to that enjoyed
by the original states over their navigable waters and waterbeds. 460 Thus,
Montana's title claims hinged on proving the rivers were navigable. 461
The district court applied the standard for navigability adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Utah:462 factual navigabil-
ity evidenced by use or susceptibility to use.463 Using that standard, the
district court granted Montana summary judgment that the rivers were navi-
gable based upon historical evidence of usage, government reports of navi-
gability, and current recreation-based commerce. 464 The district court held
that rivers serving as "channel[s] of commerce at the time of statehood"-
like the Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers-were navigable even if portions
required portage. 465 Further, the district court found the Madison River to
be navigable based on a nineteenth-century log float and modern commer-
cial use. 466
On appeal, PPL-which had presented historical documents and ex-
pert testimony disputing navigability 467-argued that the district court erred
in its application of the Utah standard and that summary judgment was
inappropriate. 468 The Court upheld the district court's application, finding
that the Utah standard allowed broad consideration of commerce.469 Under
Utah, susceptibility to commerce-even future forms of commerce-was
sufficient to establish navigability at statehood regardless of whether a river
contained non-navigable portions. 4 70 Thus, Montana was entitled to sum-
mary judgment because PPL's evidence failed to raise genuine issues of
material fact under the Court's broad interpretation of navigability. 471
The Court made further determinations not addressed in this short.
First, the riverbeds were public trust lands under Article X, § 11 of the
458. "The 'equal footing doctrine' holds that a state acquires title to the streambeds of navigable
rivers within its borders upon entrance to the Union." PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 428 n.5.
459. Id.
460. Id. (citing Mont. Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984))
(emphasis added).
461. Id.
462. U.S. v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
463. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 431.
464. Id. at 431-433.
465. Id. at 447.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 433-434.
468. Id. at 447.
469. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 446-447.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 449.
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Montana Constitution. 472 Second, PPL's right to appropriate water for ben-
eficial hydroelectric use did not incidentally confer a right to uncompen-
sated access to state land.473 Third, the Federal Power Act did not preempt
the Hydroelectric Resources Act.474 Ultimately, the Court held that Mon-
tana's Hydroelectric Resources Act applied to PPL's Thompson Falls and
Missouri-Madison projects,475 and emphasized that the State's Land Board
had "a constitutional and statutory duty to seek" 476 full market value for its
interest in the riverbeds. 477
The Court then examined Montana's damage award. At trial, the dis-
trict court favored the State's "shared net benefits" analysis over PPL's
"cost method" calculation. 478 The shared-net-benefits methodology deter-
mined fair market value by apportioning a percentage of PPL's net revenue
based on the State's cumulative interest in the power sites.479 PPL argued
on appeal that damages could not be based on profits, that the district court
erred in calculating the figure, and that the shared-net-benefits analysis
inappropriately departed from previously accepted methodology. 480 The
State countered with examples of comparable shared-net-benefits applica-
tions481 and drew parallels to Montana's existing, output-based compensa-
tion schemes for "agricultural, grazing, geothermal, and wind-energy
leases."482
The Court upheld the district court's analysis, holding that Montana's
profitability approach483 properly accounted for the productive value of the
land.484 Statutory language in the Hydroelectric Resources Act granted
wide latitude-including output-based calculation 485-to collect full mar-
ket value for power site rental.486 Previous authority dealt with state-regu-
lated energy monopolies, and the Court held the district court properly ac-
472. Id. at 450.
473. Id. at 451.
474. Id. at 454.
475. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 454.
476. Id. at 454 n. 11.
477. Id. at 458.
478. Id. at 456.
479. Id. at 455.
480. Id. at 457.
481. Shared-net-benefits calculations were found not to be in error in Cent. Me. Power Co., 640
A.2d 1064 (Me. 1984) and several federal tribal cases; see e.g. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 12 F.E.R.C.
63055 (F. Elec. Reg. Commn. 1980); U.S. v. Pend Oreille Co. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 135 F.3d 602 (9th
Cir. 1998).
482. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 458.
483. Id. at 458-459.
484. Id. at 458.
485. Id. (citing State ex rel Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 811-812 (Mont. 1966)).
486. Id.
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counted for PPL's greater profit potential. 487 According to the Court, the
district court did not err in reaching an unprecedented conclusion because it
dealt with unprecedented facts.488
The Montana Water Resources Association, the Montana Farm Bu-
reau, and the Association of Gallatin Agricultural Irrigators filed amici cu-
riae briefs expressing concern that the Court's ruling could hinder river
water appropriation. 489 The Court responded to them by name in its opin-
ion, reasserting Montana's constitutional obligation to seek full market
value for disposition of public trust land, but limiting its holding to "the
specific facts and applicable provisions of the [Hydroelectric Resources
Act] .-490 The Court cautioned that other general laws could provide assess-
ment methods for other usage of state land.491
Justice Rice dissented, arguing the Court misapplied the title test by
failing to limit its susceptibility analysis to the "customary modes of trade
and travel at the time of statehood" 492 and by failing to examine navigabil-
ity piece by piece.493 Rice argued that the Utah Court determined that title
to the Colorado River was split between the federal and state govern-
ments.494 There, the federal government retained title to non-navigable
stretches of the river.495 Justice Rice interpreted the title test as inherently
fact-driven and consequently inappropriate for disposition by summary
judgment because PPL presented sufficient evidence that the rivers were
non-navigable at the time of statehood. 496
The Montana practitioner should be aware that the State is constitu-
tionally obligated to seek full market value for its interest in public trust
lands. Montana's success in PPL demonstrates that longstanding access ar-
rangements are not safe from reevaluation. While the Court specifically
limited its opinion to the facts at issue, its reasoning places Montana in a
strong position to seek compensation for its public trust land interests. The
Court has drawn a roadmap for legislators that should give pause to farm-
ers, ranchers, and anyone else who appropriates water from state rivers.
-Joshua van Swearingen
487. Id. at 459-460.
488. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 459-460.
489. Id. at 460.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 461-462 (citing N.D. ex rel Bd. of U. & Sch. Lands v. U.S., 972 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir.
1992)) (Rice, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 462.
494. PPL Mont., LLC, 229 P.3d at 463 (Rice, J., dissenting).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 464.
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